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Failed Charity: Taking State Tax Benefits
into Account for Purposes of the Charitable
Deduction
ROGER COLINVAUX†
ABSTRACT
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) substantially limited the
ability of individuals to deduct state and local taxes (SALT) on
their federal income tax returns. Some states are advancing
schemes to allow taxpayers a state tax credit for contributions to a
charity controlled by the state. The issue is whether state tax
benefits are deductible as a charitable contribution for purposes of
the federal income tax. Under a general rule of prior law—the full
deduction rule—state tax benefits were ignored for purposes of the
charitable deduction. If the full deduction rule is applied to the
state workaround schemes, then the SALT limitation can
successfully be avoided. This Article explains that after the TCJA,
the legal basis for the full deduction rule is undermined. The IRS
articulated the full deduction rule given the longstanding baseline
of deductible state tax payments. Thus, to allow a charitable
deduction for state tax benefits under prior law was simply to
allow a deduction for an otherwise deductible expense. After the
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TCJA, this symmetry with the SALT deduction is gone and the full
deduction rule is of questionable applicability. A charitable
deduction for state tax benefits would allow taxpayers to deduct
amounts not spent and even to profit from charitable transfers.
The charitable deduction is intended to encourage giving, not tax
avoidance. Thus, the Treasury Department and the courts should
apply a longstanding principle of charitable contribution law that
measures a contribution by the amount of taxpayer sacrifice. After
the TCJA, a contribution should be reduced by the value of state
tax benefits, whether the benefits take the form of a credit or a
deduction. The reasoning applies both to state workaround credits
(and deductions) and to existing state tax benefits that previously
have been deducted as charitable. Further, denying a charitable
deduction for previously deductible expenses is in fact consistent
with the status quo prior to the TCJA, in that, given the loss of a
SALT deduction, the charitable deduction was an offset that did
not provide a meaningful benefit to taxpayers.

INTRODUCTION
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) 1 limited the federal
income tax itemized deduction for state and local taxes
(SALT or the “SALT deduction”) to $10,000 annually. 2 As a
result, taxpayers who formerly deducted state and local
taxes in excess of $10,000 lose a significant tax benefit.3 In
response, some state governments have enacted
workarounds to preserve the federal deductibility of
payments that inure to the benefit of the state and other

1. Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). The official title of the legislation is “An act to
provide for reconciliation pursuant to Titles II and V of the concurrent
resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2018.”
2. Id. § 11042 at 2085–86. For married taxpayers filing separately, the
limit is $5,000. The limitation expires for taxable years beginning on or after
January 1, 2026.
3. If such taxpayers continue to itemize, the amount no longer deductible is
the amount of taxes paid less $10,000. If such taxpayers take the standard
deduction ($24,000 for a couple filing jointly and $12,000 for singles), then the
amount no longer deductible depends on various factors. For example, if a
couple filing jointly took the standard deduction of $24,000 and had no other
potentially deductible expenses (e.g., mortgage interest, charitable
contributions), then the amount no longer deductible to them would be the
amount of taxes paid less $24,000).
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states are considering similar legislation. 4
The general approach is for a state to provide a tax
credit for payments to a charity 5 that is controlled by the
state.6 If the payment qualifies as a charitable
contribution,7 then the payment is deductible for federal
income tax purposes. The workarounds thus contemplate
the recharacterization of nondeductible state tax payments
as deductible charitable contributions. The Treasury
Department has announced its intention to issue proposed
regulations on the tax treatment of these types of
arrangements.8
The issue raised by the workarounds is whether a
taxpayer’s receipt of state tax benefits in connection with a
payment to charity affects the allowance of a charitable
deduction. If state tax benefits are ignored for charitable
contribution purposes, then the workarounds will succeed
in avoiding the SALT limitation. If, on the other hand, state

4. Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, Connecticut and Oregon have
enacted workaround credit schemes. See, e.g., Ryan Hutchins, New Jersey
Legislature Passes SALT Workaround, POLITICO (Apr. 12, 2018, 7:23 PM),
https://www.politico.com/states/new-jersey/story/2018/04/12/new-jerseylegislature-passes-salt-workaround-362279; Gerald B. Silverman, New York
Legislature Enacts Major Tax Overhaul, BNA (Apr. 2, 2018),
https://www.bna.com/new-york-legislature-n57982090688/.
5. “Charity” in this Article is shorthand for an organization eligible to
receive deductible contributions. I.R.C. § 170(c) (2012). Charities include most
organizations described in § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, and need
not be charitable but may be organized for a variety of purposes, including
charitable, educational, scientific, religious, and literary. Id. § 501(c)(3).
Charities for this purpose also include government entities. Id. § 170(c)(1).
6. New York takes a variety of approaches. Taxpayers may receive an 85%
credit on state income taxes for contributions to a state fund with separate
accounts for health and education, or for donations to a private nonprofit that
supports the State University of New York or the City University of New York.
See S.B. S7509-C, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2018).
7. I.R.C. § 170(c).
8. I.R.S. Notice 2018-54, 2018-24 I.R.B., https://www.irs.gov/irb/201824_IRB (describing the workaround credits as an effort by states to “circumvent
the new statutory limitation on state and local tax deductions”).
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tax benefits are relevant for purposes of determining a
charitable contribution, then the workarounds will provide
a reduced or no federal tax benefit.
Importantly, the issue is not limited to the state
workaround credits, but bears directly on a wide array of
other state tax credit programs that link state tax benefits
to payments to a charity. Some states for example offer a
100% credit for payments to independent charitable
organizations (i.e., charities not controlled by the state). 9 To
the extent state tax benefits are not deductible charity as
part of a SALT workaround, the same reasoning for
nondeductibility applies to these other types of payments.
Thus, how the Treasury Department (and ultimately the
courts) resolve this issue has implications not just for the
federal tax treatment of the workaround schemes but for
many existing state credits and deductions.
In weighing the issues, it is important to consider how
state tax benefits historically have been treated for
charitable deduction purposes. In general, prior to the
TCJA, a full federal charitable deduction was allowed
notwithstanding the receipt of state tax benefits for the
contribution,10 i.e., state tax benefits were ignored for
charitable deduction purposes. This position was recently
coined as the “full deduction rule” in an article by several
law professors.11 The question is whether the full deduction

9. Many of these credits are listed in the appendix to Joseph Bankman, et
al., State Response to Federal Tax Reform: Charitable Tax Credits, 159 TAX
NOTES 641 (2018) [hereinafter FDR Paper].
10. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. Mem. 201105010 (Feb. 4, 2011) [hereinafter
2011 CCA].
11. FDR Paper, supra note 9; see also Kirk J. Stark, Tax Treatment of
Charitable Contributions & State Tax Credits, 9 COLUM. J. TAX. L. TAX MATTERS
1 (2018). For convenience, this Article adopts the term “full deduction rule”
though its status as a widely known or understood rule is debatable. As the
authors of the FDR Paper note, as of 2011 “there was no judicial authority
directly addressing the full deduction rule.” FDR Paper, supra note 9, at 646.
For additional commentary, see David Gamage, Charitable Contributions in
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rule survives the TCJA. If so, then a charitable deduction of
the entire amount paid to charity may be available
notwithstanding the receipt of substantial tax benefits. 12
This Article argues that a collateral effect of the TCJA
is to change the full deduction rule. As the Article explains,
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) articulated the full
deduction rule in reliance on the longstanding legal
baseline of federally deductible state tax payments.13 Before
the TCJA, any reduction in state tax liability (because of a
state deduction or credit) meant a corresponding reduction
to a taxpayer’s SALT deduction. Thus, when a transfer
resulted in a state tax benefit under prior law, a federal
charitable deduction for the value of the state tax benefit
was offset by a lower SALT deduction.14 This pre TCJA
Lieu of SALT Deductions, 87 ST. TAX NOTES 973 (2018); JARED WALCZAK, TAX
FOUND., STATE STRATEGIES TO PRESERVE SALT DEDUCTIONS FOR HIGH-INCOME
TAXPAYERS:
WILL
THEY
WORK?
4
(2018),
https://files.taxfoundation.org/20180105094213/Tax-Foundation-FF569.pdf;
Amandeep S. Grewal, The Charitable Contribution Strategy: An Ineffective
SALT Substitute, 38 VA. TAX. REV (Forthcoming 2018 [hereinafter Grewal,
Ineffective SALT Substitute]; Eric Bennett Rasmussen, Getting Around the State
and Local Tax Deduction Limit (Jan. 9, 2018) (unpublished manuscript)
(available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3099296);
Andy Grewal, Can States Game the Republican Tax Bill with the Charitable
Contribution Strategy?, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Jan. 3, 2018),
http://yalejreg.com/nc/can-states-game-the-republican-tax-bill-with-thecharitable-contribution-strategy/.
12. The authors of the FDR Paper believe that the deductibility of payments
pursuant to state workaround schemes generally should withstand
administrative and judicial challenge, except perhaps in the case of a 100
percent state credit. FDR Paper, supra note 9, at 642. There are other possible
ways to attack the state workaround credits. Professor Grewal for example
argues that the Treasury Department should use a substance over form
approach. Grewal, Ineffective SALT Substitute, supra note 11, at 2 (discussing
different approaches and concluding that “nominal donations to state-controlled
funds should be treated as the payment of state taxes”).
13. See discussion infra Section II.A.
14. See discussion infra Section II.A. For alternative minimum tax
taxpayers, however, the charitable deduction represented a gain, not an offset
to the loss of a SALT deduction. This is because the SALT deduction is not
available for alternative minimum tax (AMT) taxpayers while the charitable
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symmetry appears to be a main reason the IRS decided that
state tax benefits could be deducted as charitable
contributions. After the TCJA, however, this symmetry is
gone. Accordingly, the ongoing validity of the full deduction
rule is doubtful and has little to no bearing on how state tax
benefits should be treated after the TCJA.
The TCJA’s mooting of the full deduction rule means
that the treatment of tax benefits for charitable
contribution purposes is an open question. In deciding the
issue, the Treasury Department and the courts should
follow a longstanding principle of charitable contribution
law, namely that a contribution is measured by the extent
to which a taxpayer has given something away. When a
taxpayer receives state tax benefits for a contribution, the
cost to the taxpayer, i.e., the taxpayer’s sacrifice, is reduced.
Thus, a contribution for tax purposes should not include the
value of tax benefits received. The full deduction rule is not
a barrier to this result.
Indeed, after the TCJA, to ignore tax benefits as return
benefits would convert the charitable contributions
deduction from an incentive to give into an incentive to
profit. This could occur because the state workaround
credits and many other state tax credits potentially become
economic windfalls that would make taxpayers better off.
For example, under a 100% state tax credit program, if a
taxpayer transfers $100 to charity the taxpayer could
receive $137 as a direct result. Any reasonable construction
of the meaning of a “contribution” for purposes of the
charitable deduction does not include such windfalls. In the
words of the Supreme Court, if a transfer improves a
taxpayer’s economic position, the transfer is not
“unrequited” because the “external features” of the
deduction is available. See SASHA PUDELSKI & CARL DAVIS, INST. ON TAX’N &
ECON. POL’Y, PUBLIC LOSS PRIVATE GAIN: HOW SCHOOL VOUCHER TAX SHELTERS
UNDERMINE
PUBLIC
EDUCATION4
(2017),
https://itep.org/wpcontent/uploads/AASA_Public_Loss_Private_Gain_F2.pdf.
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transaction show a net benefit to the taxpayer.15 The full
deduction rule should not and need not be applied beyond
its pre-TCJA context to allow the deduction of profit.16
Part I of the Article provides an overview of the
meaning of a “contribution” for purposes of the charitable
deduction. The general principle, as reflected in Supreme
Court jurisprudence, is that a contribution reflects a notion
of sacrifice, i.e., a contribution is the amount a taxpayer
gives away. Part II discusses the full deduction rule and
shows that the TCJA casts serious doubt on its ongoing
validity both as a matter of law and in light of congressional
intent. Part II also explains that the Treasury Department
and the courts should characterize state tax benefits as
return benefits that reduce the amount of, or eliminate, the
charitable deduction. Doing so sensibly reflects the
longstanding definition of a contribution as the amount
sacrificed by the taxpayer. To do otherwise, would convert
the charitable deduction into an instrument of profit, not an
incentive to give. Part III extends the analysis to state tax
benefits other than the workaround credits and briefly
considers administrative concerns. The Article then
concludes that state tax benefits should be treated as
return benefits for purposes of the charitable deduction.
I. THE MEANING OF CONTRIBUTION AS SACRIFICE
The federal charitable contributions deduction is an
incentive to give. From the initial legislative history17

15. Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 690 (1989).
16. The full deduction rule does not appear to have been applied in cases in
which a taxpayer profits from a contribution. The examples explored by the
FDR Paper authors involve cases where the taxpayer is not better off from the
contribution, even after taking tax benefits into account. See FDR Paper, supra
note 9.
17. Speaking on the Senate floor in support of a charitable deduction in
1917, Senator Hollis pronounced:
After they have done everything else they want to do, after they have
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through court decisions, the deduction is described in terms
of encouraging taxpayers to make a sacrifice.18
As explained below, how to account for benefits that
flow to a taxpayer from a transfer is fundamental to the
meaning of a contribution. In general, if a taxpayer is better
off because of a transfer (i.e., the benefits from a payment
exceed the payment), then there is no contribution. When a
taxpayer profits, then almost by definition, an incentive is
not necessary, there is no contribution, and a deduction
should not be allowed. If a taxpayer is not better off from
the transfer, and there is intent to make a gift, then the
general rule is to measure the contribution by the amount
of the transfer less the value of any return benefits
received.19 In such a case, the deductible contribution is the
amount of the taxpayer’s sacrifice.
These general rules come from the language of the
Internal Revenue Code and court decisions. Technically
speaking, the Code allows a deduction for a “charitable
contribution.”20 In defining the term, Congress provided
only that a charitable contribution is a “contribution or gift
to or for the use of” an eligible organization 21 and did not
define either contribution or gift.22 Accordingly, over the
years, the courts have wrestled with the meaning of the
educated their children and traveled and spent their money on
everything they really want or think they want, then, if they have
something left over, they will contribute it to a college or to the Red
Cross or for some scientific purposes. Now, when war comes and we
impose these very heavy taxes on incomes, that will be the first place
where the wealthy men will be tempted to economize, namely, in
donations to charity. They will say, “Charity begins at home.”
55 Cong. Rec. 6728 (1917).
18. See Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 690 (summarizing the legislative history of
the deduction as being for “unrequited payments”).
19. Treas. Reg. § 170A-1(h)(2)(i) (2008); Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104.
20. I.R.C. § 170(a) (2012).
21. Id. § 170(c).
22. Id.
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terms. One constant is that the taxpayer must have
donative intent, with a main legal issue being whether
intent is assessed by a subjective or an objective approach.
Early decisions required that a charitable contribution
be made with detached and disinterested generosity.23 This
standard was borrowed from a Supreme Court case,
Commissioner v. Duberstein,24 which construed the
meaning of a gift for purposes of the income tax exclusion.25
As a general matter, however, the Duberstein standard fell
out of favor because it relies on determining the subjective
intent of the taxpayer, making the test hard to administer.
A leading early case to reject the Duberstein approach
for charitable contributions was Singer Co. v. United
States,26 in which the Claims Court used a return benefit
test. Under a return benefit test, instead of examining the
taxpayer’s motives, the criterion is whether a taxpayer
expects to receive return benefits. If so, then the
transaction is more like an exchange for value received and
not a contribution. An advantage to a return benefit test is
that whether there is a return benefit can be determined
objectively by looking at the external features of the
transaction.
Eventually, the Supreme Court embraced the Singer
court’s approach with two decisions in the 1980s, United
States v. American Bar Endowment27 and Hernandez v.

23. DeJong v. Comm’r, 309 F.2d 373, 377–79 (9th Cir. 1962) (noting that
“contribution” and “gift” are synonymous and therefore it was appropriate to
apply the standard in Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960) on excludable
gifts to deductible contributions).
24. 363 U.S. at 287–91.
25. I.R.C. § 102.
26. 449 F.2d 413, 418 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (adopting a quid pro quo test for a
contribution and rejecting the Duberstein test because “it would then be
necessary for us to look to the subjective intent of the plaintiff . . . . This would
not be an impossible task, but it would indeed be a very difficult one.”).
27. 477 U.S. 105 (1986).
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Commissioner.28 In American Bar Endowment, the issue
was whether the taxpayers intentionally overpaid a charity
for insurance and so were able to deduct the overpayment.29
The Court held against the taxpayers, setting forth a
substantial return benefit standard for a charitable
contribution. The Court said that: “[a] payment of money
generally cannot constitute a charitable contribution if the
contributor expects a substantial benefit in return.”30 Here,
the taxpayers expected to receive insurance in exchange for
the payment to charity—a substantial benefit. Thus, as a
threshold matter, there was no contribution.
The Court acknowledged, however, that payments could
take on a dual character as part gift and part exchange,
leaving the door open to deduct an overpayment as a
contribution. The Court provided that:
a taxpayer may sometimes receive only a nominal benefit in
return for his contribution. Where the size of the payment [to
charity] is clearly out of proportion to the benefit received [by the
donor], it would not serve the purposes of § 170 to deny a
deduction altogether. A taxpayer may therefore claim a deduction
for the difference between a payment to a charitable organization
and the market value of the benefit received in return, on the
theory that the payment has the “dual character” of a purchase
and a contribution.31

Under the Court’s approach, in order for part of a dual
payment to be deductible, there are two conditions: the
payment must exceed the market value of the benefit
received and the payment “must be ‘made with the
intention of making a gift.’”32 The Court also said: “[t]he
28. 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
29. 477 U.S. at 108–09.
30. Id. at 116.
31. Id. at 117.
32. Id. (citing Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104). This standard was later
promulgated in regulations. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(h)(1) (2008) (providing that
no part of a payment made in consideration for goods or services is a
contribution unless the taxpayer “[i]ntends to make a payment in an amount
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taxpayer . . . must at a minimum demonstrate that he
purposely contributed money or property in excess of the
value of any benefit he received in return.”33
Two features of the Court’s approach are worth noting.
One is affirmance of the basic idea that a contribution
requires a sacrifice by the taxpayer. The taxpayer must
show “at a minimum” that the amount transferred exceeds
the value of any return benefit. If there is a substantial
return benefit, then there is no sacrifice and no
contribution.34 Another is that donative intent is required,
hence the Court’s references to the taxpayer’s expectations
and purpose. However, the test for intent is not a subjective
inquiry into the taxpayer’s motives but rather is based on
objective factors—the presence of return benefits.35 The
Court did not limit the types of benefits that could be
considered return benefits.36
Three years later, the Court solidified the substantial
that exceeds the fair market value of the goods or services” and “[m]akes a
payment in an amount that exceeds the fair market value of the goods or
services”).
33. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 118. As applied, the Court found that
the taxpayers failed to meet their burden as none showed awareness that
similar but cheaper insurance was available elsewhere. Notably, a charitable
deduction is not automatic if the amount transferred exceeds the value of
benefits received. The taxpayer must be able to demonstrate that the
overpayment was intentional.
34. Id. at 116.
35. Donative intent is not always easy to reduce to an objective
determination. For instance, if a business negotiates a sale to charity where the
charity pays less than fair market value, the business is not entitled to deduct
the difference absent donative intent to make a contribution, even though the
taxpayer did not receive full value. See Connell v. Comm’r, 51 T.C.M. (CCH)
1657, 1662 (1986) (holding that the sale of land for less than the appraised
value did not yield a charitable contribution because there was no evidence of
donative intent to make a gift), aff’d per curiam, 842 F.2d 285 (11th Cir. 1988);
Stark v. Comm’r, 86 T.C. 243, 256 (1986) (“The taxpayer who negotiates for the
best terms he can obtain in a commercial transaction cannot subsequently claim
a deduction based upon any excess value of the ‘contributed’ property over the
consideration received . . . .”).
36. See Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 117.
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return benefit approach in Hernandez v. Commissioner.37 In
Hernandez, the Court again rejected subjective motive as
the test for the meaning of contribution, noting that the IRS
looks to the “external features” of the transfer. External
features, the Court said, have the advantage of obviating
“the need for the IRS to conduct imprecise inquiries into the
motivations of individual taxpayers.”38 The Court also cited
1954 legislative history in which Congress defined gifts as
payments “made with no expectation of a financial return
commensurate with the amount of the gift.”39 Thus, under
both Hernandez and American Bar Endowment, the Court
looked to the external features of a transfer for return
benefits, which serve as a proxy for donative intent.
Hernandez and American Bar Endowment are known
today for the rejection of the Duberstein approach and the
embrace of an external features or quid pro quo analysis for
charitable contributions. The black letter law to emerge
from the decisions is: (1) the taxpayer may not receive more
than the taxpayer pays, (2) dual character transfers are
allowed, and (3) in the case of dual character transfers, the
amount of the contribution is the amount of the payment
less the value of benefits received.40

37. 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
38. Id. at 690–91 (noting that the Court also looked to “external features” in
American Bar Endowment).
39. Id. at 690 (citing S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 196 (1954); H.R. REP. NO. 831337, at A44 (1954)). The Court also said: “The legislative history of the
‘contribution or gift’ limitation . . . reveals that Congress intended to
differentiate between unrequited payments to qualified recipients and
payments made to such recipients in return for goods or services.” Id. The Court
went on to say unrequited payments are deductible while payments made with
an expectation of quid pro quo in terms of goods or services are not. Id.
40. Assuming there is a contribution, other rules may apply to limit the
amount of the deduction, including caps based on the taxpayer’s adjusted gross
income, whether the gift is property and if so what type, and the type of donee
(a public charity or private foundation). For an overview of applicable rules, see,
for example, Harvey P. Dale & Roger Colinvaux, The Charitable Contributions
Deduction: Federal Tax Rules, 68 TAX LAW. 331 (2015).
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The Court, however, did not address all questions. One
issue is which benefits count as “external features” of a
transaction that reduce or eliminate the deduction. In both
American Bar Endowment and Hernandez, the context is a
quid pro quo exchange, meaning that the benefits flow from
the recipient charity not a third party. 41 Thus, the Court
declares in American Bar Endowment the oft-cited
statement that: “[t]he sine qua non of a charitable
contribution is a transfer of money or property without
adequate consideration.”42 Similarly, in Hernandez, the
Court refers to the contractual concept of consideration as
important to determining whether a benefit is a relevant
external feature of the transaction.43 The Treasury
Regulations subsequently echoed the consideration
approach to return benefits, setting forth a legal standard
for the deduction when a transaction includes payments
that are “in consideration for . . . goods or services.”44 These
authorities therefore offer guidance for the typical case of
return benefits received from the charity as part of an

41. See Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 685–86; Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at
107–08.
42. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 118.
43. 490 U.S. at 690 (citing Committee report examples of a payment to a
hospital as being made “in consideration of a binding obligation to provide
medical treatment”). The issue in Hernandez was whether the return benefit
had to be of an economic nature, or whether return benefits of a religious or
spiritual nature were relevant external features of the transaction. Id. at 687.
The Court found that the religious benefits received “were part of a
quintessential quid pro quo exchange: in return for their money, petitioners
received an identifiable benefit.” Id. at 691. Importantly, the Hernandez Court
held that the return benefit did not have to be a financial benefit but could be
intangible in nature, thus expanding the scope of relevant benefits beyond the
ordinary case. See id. 692–93.
44. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(h) (2008) (setting forth the standard for
“[p]ayment in exchange for consideration”). The regulations provide that “Goods
or services means cash, property, services, benefits, and privileges,” id.
§ 1.170A-13(f)(5), and that goods or services of “insubstantial value” are
disregarded. Id. § 1.170A-13(f)(8)(i)(A).
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exchange.45
Importantly though, neither the Supreme Court nor the
Treasury regulations limit relevant benefits to those
received as consideration. Notwithstanding the specific
context of American Bar Endowment and Hernandez, case
law provides that the relevant benefits do not have to come
directly from the charity but rather flow from the transfer.
In other words, both direct and indirect benefits are
included when determining the external features of a
transaction.46
For example, in Singer, cited approvingly in American
Bar Endowment, a sewing machine company sold sewing
machines to a charity at a discount.47 The question was
whether the company could deduct the discount as a
charitable contribution, i.e., whether this was a dual
character payment qualifying for part gift-part sale
treatment.48 The court disallowed the deduction holding

45. Relatedly, the substantiation requirements for charitable contributions
are directed to quid pro quo exchanges. Donors must substantiate contributions
of $250 or more with a contemporaneous acknowledgement from the donee
charity. The acknowledgement must indicate whether the donee “provided any
goods or services in consideration” for the contribution and if so “[a] description
and good faith estimate of the value of any goods or services.” I.R.C.
§§ 170(f)(8)(B)(ii)–(iii) (2012). Charities are required to inform donors of the
amount allowed as a deduction for quid pro quo contributions of more than $75.
A quid pro quo contribution for this purpose is defined as “a payment made
partly as a contribution and partly in consideration for goods or services
provided to the payor by the donee organization.” Id. § 6115(b).
46. See Joseph Bankman, et al., Caveat IRS: Problems with Abandoning the
Full Deduction Rule, 88 ST. TAX NOTES 547, 548–49 (2018) (noting that the
“quid pro quo rule is not limited to situations in which the donor receives goods
or services directly from the donee organization. A donor’s receipt of indirect
benefits, whether from a specific third party or otherwise, has the same effect
on the amount deductible under section 170,” “the law makes no distinction
between direct and indirect benefits,” and “that the source of the benefit
received by the donor is relevant”) [hereinafter Caveat IRS].
47. Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413, 422–23 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (looking
to the substantiality of all the benefits the taxpayer received).
48. Id. at 414, 422–23.
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that Singer received a substantial indirect benefit from the
sale of the sewing machines in the form of future purchases
from the beneficiaries using the machines, i.e., something
akin to good will.49 The benefit was not provided by the
charity as part of the exchange, yet nonetheless, the return
benefit was a relevant external feature that colored the
transfer, with the result that there was no contribution.50
Similarly, in Ottawa Silica Co. v. United States, the
taxpayer donated land to a school.51 The taxpayer expected
that the ownership of the land by the school would increase
the value of the taxpayer’s property holdings.52 The court
disallowed a charitable deduction for the land because the
transaction as a whole provided a net benefit to the
taxpayer, notwithstanding the benefit to the charity. 53 In
the language of American Bar Endowment and Hernandez,
the “external features”54 of the transaction showed that the
taxpayer “expected a substantial benefit in return.”55 It did
not matter that the benefit was not consideration for the
payment to charity or that the charity did not provide the
benefit.56
In addition to not limiting the source of return benefits,
the Supreme Court’s approach to the meaning of
contribution left open the question of what makes a return
benefit “substantial” so as to disallow a contribution
entirely. The dichotomy established in American Bar
Endowment is between substantial and nominal benefits,
with no deduction for the former, and dual character
49. Id. at 424.
50. Id. at 423–24.
51. 699 F.2d 1124, 1131 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
52. Id. at 1135.
53. Id.
54. Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 691 (1989).
55. United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 116 (1986).
56. Ottawa Silica Co., 699 F.2d at 1135.
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treatment for the latter.57 The language of American Bar
Endowment therefore suggests that if a benefit is less than
the amount of the payment, but not nominal, no deduction
is allowed even though the taxpayer has given something
away.58 In practice, however, the IRS has been inclined to
allow a deduction so long as there is significant sacrifice.59
Notably, absent further direction from the Supreme Court,
determining the substantiality of a return benefit has been
within the IRS’s discretion.60
In summary, under prevailing authorities, the test for a
contribution is one of substantial return benefit. Donative
intent is required but is based upon the external features of
the transaction not on a subjective inquiry into the
taxpayer’s motives. As a general matter, if a taxpayer is
better off because of the transfer, then the external features
of the transaction suggest that there is no donative intent,
and no charitable deduction is allowed even if a charity
benefits. Although most of the authorities relate to quid pro
quo exchanges where return benefits are provided by the

57. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 116–17.
58. Under the “nominal” benefit test, in theory if a benefit is 99% of the
payment (e.g., a taxpayer pays $100 to charity and receives $99 in return), a
deduction of $1 should not be allowed.
59. Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104, example 2 (allowing a deduction
where return benefit was one-third of the amount paid). The intentionality of an
overpayment generally can be shown by the required substantiation whereby
the donee charity informs the donor that goods and services were provided in
connection with the gift and provides a good faith estimate of the value of the
goods and services. I.R.C. § 170(f)(8)(B) (2012). Through this paperwork, the
intentionality of an overpayment is established objectively.
60. See Rev. Proc. 90-12, 1990-1 C.B. 471 (providing that “charities offering
certain small items or other benefits of token value may treat the benefits as
having insubstantial value so that they may advise contributors that
contributions are fully deductible under section 170”); William A. Drennan,
Where Generosity and Pride Abide: Charitable Naming Rights, 80 U. CIN. L.
REV. 45, 56 (2011) (noting that “the Treasury Department and the IRS have
adopted a series of authorities effectively valuing naming rights at zero, which
allows naming donors to deduct their total transfers to charity”
notwithstanding the receipt of something of contractual value).
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charity, indirect benefits also count as external features of a
transaction. The courts have not provided a bright line to
determine when a return benefit that is less than the
amount paid is substantial.
II. STATE TAX BENEFITS AS RETURN BENEFITS
The question presented in the aftermath of the TCJA is
whether to take tax benefits into account as relevant
external features of a transfer in determining the amount,
if any, of a charitable contribution. This part of the Article
explains that although tax benefits generally were ignored
prior to the TCJA, the TCJA fundamentally has changed
the legal landscape by limiting the SALT deduction. This
change paves the way for tax benefits to be considered as
relevant external features that may and should be taken
into account for purposes of determining a contribution
under longstanding principles of charitable contribution
law.
A. Contextualizing the Full Deduction Rule
Prior law (i.e., pre-TCJA law) supports a proposition
that has been termed the “full deduction rule” by several
law professors in a recent article (the FDR Paper).61 Under
the full deduction rule, tax benefits generally are ignored
for charitable deduction purposes, in that they neither
negate donative intent nor constitute a return benefit that
reduces the amount of the deduction. As discussed below,
after the TCJA the full deduction rule is best viewed in
context and does not provide meaningful authority for
ignoring tax benefits when determining the extent of a
contribution.

61. FDR Paper, supra note 9, at 642, 654 (stating that the full deduction
rule is “well-settled law” supported by “decades of precedent”).
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1. Relevance of the pre-TCJA legal baseline
The FDR Paper emphasizes an IRS Chief Counsel
Advice from 2011 (2011 CCA) as “summariz[ing]” “the legal
authority supporting the full deduction rule.”62 The issue in
the 2011 CCA was whether a transfer to a charity that
entitles the taxpayer to a state tax credit should be
characterized as a charitable contribution or as a payment
of state tax liability. 63 In discussing the issue, the IRS noted
that donative intent was required for a charitable
contribution, and recited the general rules on donative
intent, including the Singer, American Bar Endowment,
and Hernandez cases.64 The IRS concluded that “[t]he tax
benefit of a federal or state charitable contribution
deduction is not regarded as a return benefit that negates
charitable intent, reducing or eliminating the deduction
itself.”65 On its face, as the FDR Paper suggests, this
statement supports a full deduction rule, i.e., that tax
benefits are ignored for contribution purposes.66

62. Id. at 644 (discussing I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. Mem. 201105010 (Feb. 4,
2011)). For additional discussion, see Peter L. Faber, Comment on Professor
Stark’s Prompt, 9 COLUM. J. TAX. L. TAX MATTERS 9, 9 (2018) (noting that the
2011 CCA “is not precedential and does not necessarily state the IRS’s official
position”); Jared Walczak, The Ways of Paradox: What Renders a Contribution
Deductible?, 9 COLUM. J. TAX. L. TAX MATTERS 4, 7 (2018) (noting the limitations
of the 2011 CCA); Grewal, Ineffective SALT Substitute, supra note 11, at 8
(noting that “reliance on the memo seems misplaced, however. By law, that
memo may not be cited as precedent, and it has no greater authority than other
internal IRS memos, including those that express concerns over whether state
tax credits negate a taxpayer’s charitable intent”).
63. 2011 CCA, supra note 10, at 2.
64. Id.
65. Id. A main issue was whether a state tax credit should be treated
differently from a state tax deduction. The IRS made a similar statement in
CCA 200238041, noting that a state charitable contribution deduction “is not
viewed as a return benefit that reduces or eliminates a deduction under § 170,
or vitiates charitable intent.” I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. Mem. 200238041 (Sept.
20, 2002); see also FDR Paper, supra note 9, at 645 (discussing CCA
200238041).
66. FDR Paper, supra note 9, at 644–45.
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After the TCJA, however, the IRS’s articulation of the
full deduction rule should be viewed against the then
prevailing legal baseline of deductible state taxes. Notably,
in the 2011 CCA, the IRS said that “[t]here may be unusual
circumstances in which it would be appropriate to
recharacterize a payment of cash or property that was, in
form, a charitable contribution as, in substance, a
satisfaction of tax liability.”67 But, such a recharacterization
was not called for at the time because
[g]enerally . . . a state or local tax benefit is treated for federal tax
purposes as a reduction or potential reduction in tax liability. As
such, it is reflected in a reduced deduction for the payment of state
or local tax under [SALT] not as consideration that might
constitute a quid pro quo, for purposes of [a charitable
contribution].68

Thus, the IRS concluded that the state tax benefit was
not a return benefit for charitable deduction purposes
because the state benefit comes at a cost in the form of a
reduced SALT deduction. The IRS noted specifically that
the “[t]axpayers are not entitled to a [SALT] deduction for
the amount of the state tax credit used to offset their State
tax liability.”69 In other words, given the general
deductibility of state income taxes on federal returns,70 if a
state offers a reduction in state income tax for charitable
contributions (whether by credit or deduction), the reduced
67. 2011 CCA, supra note 10, at 4. At the time of the IRS opinion, it may
have been hard to foresee an “unusual circumstance” when a substance over
form analysis would be required. But that was before the TCJA made state
workaround schemes in the economic self-interest of a taxpayer. See Walczak,
supra note 62, at 7 (noting that if the state workaround credits “do not
constitute such circumstances, it is difficult to imagine what would”).
68. 2011 CCA, supra note 10, at 4.
69. Id.
70. Prior to the TCJA, there was no express limit on the itemized deduction
for state and local taxes. That said, as an itemized deduction, the deduction is
not available to nonitemizers. Also, before the TCJA, the SALT deduction was
subject to the overall limitation on itemized deductions, known as the Pease
limitation. I.R.C. § 63 (2012).
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state tax liability means the loss of a SALT deduction in the
same amount. Thus, in the IRS’s view, it did not make
sense to regard a state tax credit as a return benefit.71
To illustrate, assume a taxpayer who is in a 37% federal
income tax bracket and has state income tax liability. 72 Also
assume that the state allows a 100% income tax credit for
payments to the X Fund, which is a section 501(c)(3)
organization. Before the TCJA, for every $1,000 the
taxpayer pays the state in taxes, the taxpayer gets a $1,000
SALT deduction, saving the taxpayer $370. 73 Thus, the
after-tax cost of the $1,000 tax payment is $630. By
contrast, if the taxpayer makes a $1,000 payment to the X
Fund, the $1,000 reduction in state taxes from the credit
71. The IRS also says in another ruling (also cited by the FDR Paper
authors), that it does not make sense to view state tax benefits as the
“equivalent of a payment to the taxpayer” because the benefit “simply enters
into the computation of the taxpayer’s state or local tax liability and is reflected
in the amount of the taxpayer’s § 164 [SALT] deduction.” I.R.S. Chief Couns.
Adv. Mem. 201147024, n.1 (Nov. 25, 2011). The IRS makes a similar point in
IRS Chief Couns. Adv. Mem. 200435001, noting that “if a charitable
contribution deduction under § 170 of the Internal Revenue Code is not
allowable for federal income tax purposes, it is possible that an equivalent
deduction may be allowable under I.R.C. § 162 or § 164, as a payment of state
tax.” I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. Mem. 200435001 (Aug. 27, 2004).
72. The current top marginal rate is 37 percent. Before the TCJA, the top
marginal rate was 39.6 percent. TCJA, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11001, 131 Stat.
2054, 2054–59 (2017) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.);
Historical Highest Marginal Income Tax Rates, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Mar. 22, 2017),
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/historical-highest-marginal-incometax-rates.
73. The examples also assume the taxpayer does not owe AMT. Because
state taxes are not deductible for AMT purposes but charitable contributions
are, it has been possible to derive a profit from the combined value of state tax
credits and the federal charitable deduction. This was an arguable misuse of the
charitable deduction under prior law and has been described as a questionable
tax shelter. See PUDELSKI & DAVIS, supra note 14, at 3–4 (relaying several
different tax shelter promotions such as: “If you are a taxpayer stuck in . . .
AMT, this charitable contribution can make you money!”; “you can make money
by donating”; “you will end with more money than when you started”). To the
extent the full deduction rule was used to validate profit-taking via the
charitable deduction for AMT taxpayers, it was applied beyond the confines of
the CCA, the legal baseline for which was deductible state taxes.
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also means a reduced SALT deduction of $1,000. In other
words, the taxpayer stands to lose the value of the SALT
deduction ($370) by making the payment to charity. Thus, if
the taxpayer makes the payment to charity, and it is not
deductible as a charitable contribution, the after-tax cost to
the taxpayer is $1,000, meaning that the taxpayer is worse
off than if the taxpayer had made the payment directly to
the state.
Under these circumstances, the IRS viewed the state
tax credit as a detriment not a benefit. Although the
taxpayer receives a dollar for dollar return for the
contribution in terms of reduced tax liability, because of the
loss of the SALT deduction, the return does not benefit the
taxpayer apart from the intangible and incidental benefit of
allocating tax dollars to a particular cause. Thus, rightly or
wrongly, by applying a full deduction rule and ignoring the
state tax benefit, the IRS simply allowed the deduction (as
a charitable contribution) of an otherwise deductible
expense.
To take the illustration further, once a charitable
deduction of the $1,000 payment to the X Fund is allowed,
the value of the $1,000 deduction to the taxpayer is $370,
bringing the after-tax cost of the $1,000 outlay back to
$630. By applying a full deduction rule, instead of paying
$370 as a SALT deduction, the federal government pays
$370 as a charitable deduction.74 The state has the same
spending power ($1,000, through the charity). The federal
government makes the same contribution ($370). The
taxpayer’s total outlay in either case is $1,000, the after-tax
cost of which is $670. Allowing the charitable deduction for
the state tax benefit does not benefit the taxpayer who is in
the same position after taxes as if the taxpayer paid the
state directly.

74. All the State achieves with the 100% credit is to direct the taxpayer’s
payment toward a particular cause sanctioned by the State.
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The same analysis applies to less lucrative state tax
benefits, whether in the form of a credit or a deduction. For
example, assume that a state offers either a 10% credit or a
deduction for contributions to a section 501(c)(3)
organization. Also assume that the state income tax is a flat
rate of 10% and again that the taxpayer is in a 37% federal
income tax bracket. If the taxpayer makes a $1,000
payment to a 501(c)(3) organization, pursuant to either the
credit or the deduction, the payment reduces state taxes by
$100. The reduction in state taxes also means the loss of a
$100 SALT deduction. As before, even though the value of
the tax benefit is much less ($100), the tax benefit is still a
detriment to the taxpayer for federal tax purposes because
of the related loss of a $100 SALT deduction (a $37 value).
For the IRS to allow the $100 tax benefit to be deducted as
a charitable contribution under the full deduction rule
again is simply to allow the taxpayer to recover what would
otherwise be a deductible amount.
Critically, therefore, when the IRS articulated the full
deduction rule, the context was the pre TCJA legal
baseline: the federal deductibility of state and local tax
payments. The full deduction rule was the mechanism for
allowing the deduction of an otherwise deductible amount.
Put another way, the full deduction rule was a means of
implementing the policy of the SALT deduction rather than
the policy of the charitable deduction. By limiting the SALT
deduction, however, the TCJA undercuts the reasoning that
supported the full deduction rule, i.e., the loss of the SALT
deduction due to the contribution. Thus, the TCJA has
opened the door for the Treasury Department and the
courts to characterize state tax benefits as an external
feature that should be considered in determining whether
there is a contribution.
2. Case law cited in support of the full deduction rule
In addition, the cases the IRS cited in the 2011 CCA in
support of the full deduction rule do not stand for a bright
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line rule that receipt of tax benefits are ignored. Instead,
the cases discuss the role of a tax avoidance motive in
determining the donative intent of the taxpayer (i.e., the
relevance of the fact that a taxpayer gives because of the tax
benefits and not from a pure charitable impulse). The cases
generally conclude that a tax avoidance motive is not
controlling.
For example, in McLennan v. United States, the IRS
argued that the taxpayers contributed a conservation
easement solely for the tax benefits and other selfish
reasons, and therefore the deduction should be disallowed. 75
The court disagreed, finding that, tax benefits aside, the
taxpayers “believed that the imposition of a conservation
easement would decrease the value of their property. Their
decision to donate the easement was, therefore, not an easy
one.”76 The court also said that the taxpayers “did not
inquire into the tax consequences of the conveyance until
after the decision to transfer the scenic easement was
made” and “were [not] motivated by tax concerns in
granting the scenic easement.”77 Thus, the court concluded:
“Any benefit which inured to plaintiff from the conveyance
was merely incidental to an important, public spirited,
charitable purpose” and the taxpayers therefore had “the
requisite donative intent.”78 Setting aside the court’s
(somewhat questionable) reliance on subjective concerns,
the case stands for the proposition that when a taxpayer
has given up something of value, the fact that tax benefits
are part of a taxpayer’s motive for giving is not controlling.
Similarly, in Skripak v. Commissioner, the IRS also
argued that the taxpayers were motivated by tax avoidance
in making charitable contributions and so should not get a
75. 24 Cl. Ct. 102, 105 (1991), aff’d, 994 F.2d 839 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
76. Id. at 106.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 107.
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deduction.79 The court, however, said that “a taxpayer’s
desire to avoid or eliminate taxes by contributing cash or
property to charities cannot be used as a basis for
disallowing
the
deduction
for
that
charitable
80
contribution.”
This statement merely confirms that
subjective motive is not the test for a contribution. What
mattered to the court in Skripak was the outcome of the
taxpayer’s actions, namely that they actually contributed
property (books) to charity; their reason for doing so was
not significant.81 The court said, citing Gregory v. Helvering:
“the determinative question is ‘whether what was done,
apart from the tax motive, was the thing which the statute
intended.’”82 Helping charity by providing books for use in
charitable programs “is precisely the result intended by [the
charitable deduction].”83
3. Summary
In sum, the full deduction rule, as embodied by the
IRS’s statement in the 2011 CCA that the receipt of state
tax benefits “is not regarded as a return benefit that
negates charitable intent, reducing or eliminating the
deduction itself” is now of questionable applicability. 84 The
IRS made the statement in reliance on the longstanding
general rule, now changed, that state tax payments were

79. See 84 T.C. 285, 314 (1985).
80. Id. at 319.
81. Id. at 319–20.
82. Id. at 319 (quoting Gregory v. Helving, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935)).
83. Id. at 319–20. That said, the taxpayers in Skripak overvalued the books,
and although the court found they were entitled to a charitable deduction, the
amount was reduced to the actual value. Id. at 328–29. In addition to
McClennan and Skripak, the IRS in the 2011 CCA cited Allen v. Comm’r, 92
T.C. 1 (1989), aff’d, 925 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1991). See 2011 CCA, supra note 10,
at 9–10 (Feb. 4, 2011) (applying substance over form analysis to find that
nothing of value was conveyed to charity and so denying a charitable
deduction).
84. 2011 CCA, supra note 10, at 4.
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federally deductible. As such, the full deduction rule was
used to implement the policy of the SALT deduction.
Further, the cases cited in support of the full deduction rule
stand for the proposition that subjective reasons (tax
benefits) for making a transfer are not determinative in
deciding whether a taxpayer has made a contribution.
These cases have little to no bearing on the question of
whether tax benefits are relevant external features of a
transaction. Accordingly, the full deduction rule does not
reflect black letter law after the TCJA and should not be
relied upon to decide whether tax benefits are taken into
account for contribution purposes.
B. Denying a Charitable Deduction for State Tax Benefits
After the TCJA, state and local tax payments over
$10,000 are not deductible on federal returns.85 The issue is
whether the nondeductibility of state taxes affects whether
tax benefits should be taken into account as return benefits
for purposes of the charitable deduction. As explained
below, after the TCJA, to allow a charitable deduction for
state tax benefits would run counter to the longstanding
principle of charitable contribution law that a deduction
should be allowed only to the extent a taxpayer makes a
sacrifice. When the cost of a taxpayer’s contribution is
reduced by state tax benefits, the reduced cost should be
reflected in the measure of the contribution for federal tax
purposes. Further, the failure to take state tax benefits into
account would convert the charitable deduction from an
incentive to give into an incentive to profit, which would be
woefully inconsistent with the purpose of the deduction.
1. State tax benefits reduce the taxpayer’s cost
As explained in Part I, the essential measure of a

85. Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11042, 131 Stat. 2054, 2088–87 (2017) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
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contribution is the extent of a taxpayer’s sacrifice. The
standard quid pro quo analysis measures a contribution by
the amount transferred less the amount received. This
measure is intended to capture the amount a taxpayer has
given away, i.e., the taxpayer’s cost. Only this amount is, or
should be, deductible. Direct and indirect benefits are
included in the calculation and the benefit does not have to
be provided by the charity.
State tax benefits for charitable transfers reduce the
taxpayer’s cost. Assume that a state provides a 100% state
income tax credit for a transfer to a charity. A taxpayer
makes a $1,000 payment to charity. In return, the taxpayer
may reduce state income taxes by $1,000. The net cost to
the taxpayer from the transfer is zero. The measure of the
contribution for federal purposes should reflect the
taxpayer’s cost and be zero, i.e., no charitable deduction.
Assume instead that a state with a flat state income tax
rate of 10% provides a 10% credit, or a deduction, for
charitable transfers. A taxpayer makes a $1,000 payment to
charity. Whether the incentive is the credit or the
deduction, the payment entitles the taxpayer to reduce
state income taxes by $100. The cost to the taxpayer from
the transfer is $900. The measure of the contribution for
federal purposes again should reflect the taxpayer’s cost
and be $900, i.e., a federal charitable deduction of $900.
In other words, under both examples, taxpayers should
not be allowed a federal charitable deduction for state tax
benefits. The contribution for federal purposes should
reflect the amount transferred less benefits received. 86 As

86. One could argue that the measure of the contribution should take
federal tax benefits into account, and further that it is inconsistent to consider
state but not federal tax benefits as return benefits. The federal charitable
deduction, however, is best viewed as a giving incentive, the point of which is to
reduce the taxpayer’s cost. The question is by how much. To the extent the
taxpayer’s cost is already partially subsidized by state tax benefits, there is,
after the TCJA, no reason to subsidize the state subsidy with the charitable
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explained in Section II.A the full deduction rule is not a
barrier to this result. Further, the result is consistent with
the longstanding interpretation of a contribution as
reflecting a taxpayer’s sacrifice or cost. The result also is
consistent with the Supreme Court’s approach to assessing
a contribution and donative intent based on the external
features of the transfer. State tax benefits are objectively
determinable and not based on the taxpayer’s motive.
Moreover, disallowing a deduction for state tax benefits
also is consistent with either of the main theories of the
charitable deduction. Under a subsidy theory, the
charitable deduction is intended as an incentive to make a
sacrifice.87 State tax benefits reduce the taxpayer’s sacrifice.
Allowing their deduction as charity is to incentivize state
tax benefits, not personal sacrifice. Further, under the less
widely accepted base-defining theory, a charitable
deduction is allowed only for amounts not available for the
taxpayer’s personal consumption.88 State tax benefits
restore income to the taxpayer for personal use, meaning
that the taxpayer has an ability to pay federal tax with
respect to the state tax benefit. In short, under either
theory, to allow a charitable deduction for state tax benefits
is to allow a deduction even though the taxpayer has not
suffered a reduction in wealth.89
deduction. To reduce the amount of the federal subsidy by taking into account
the value of federal tax benefits, however, would be an indirect way of reducing
the cost of the federal subsidy that runs counter to the traditional measure of
the contribution amount and undoubtedly would require legislation.
87. John D. Colombo, The Marketing of Philanthropy and the Charitable
Contributions Deduction: Integrating Theories for the Deduction and Tax
Exemption, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 657, 682 (2001) (noting that the
conventional wisdom is that charitable tax benefits subsidize the social benefits
charities provide).
88. William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86
HARV. L. REV. 309, 344–76 (1972). For a discussion of the base-defining and
subsidy theories and implications for tax reform, see Roger Colinvaux, Rationale
and Changing the Charitable Deduction, 138 TAX NOTES 1453 (2013).
89. See Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey H. Kahn, “Gifts, Gafts, and Gefts” – The
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2. An incentive to profit
In addition, to allow a taxpayer a charitable deduction
for state tax benefits potentially is to convert the charitable
deduction from an incentive to give into an incentive to
profit. Doing so would be contrary to the purpose of the
charitable deduction and is not required by the TCJA.
For example, assume a taxpayer that has $40,000 of
now nondeductible state tax liability and who is in a 37%
federal income tax bracket.90 The state allows a state
income tax reduction for payments to Fund X. If the
taxpayer pays $40,000 to the state as income taxes the
after-tax cost to the taxpayer is $40,000. But, if payments to
Fund X are federally deductible as charitable contributions,
then depending on the level of the state tax benefit it may
be in the taxpayer’s economic interest to make a
contribution to Fund X.
First, assume that a state provides a 100% income tax
credit for contributions to Fund X. The taxpayer pays
$40,000 to Fund X, which (for the sake of argument) is
deductible as a federal charitable contribution. In return,
the taxpayer gets a $40,000 reduction in state taxes plus a
federal charitable deduction worth $14,800 ($40,000 times
37%). By reason of the payment to Fund X, the taxpayer
saves $14,800—a net benefit. Thus, the taxpayer will profit
by making the outlay to Fund X instead of paying the state
directly. In other words, if a charitable deduction for the
state tax benefit is allowed, the federal government
finances a windfall to the taxpayer who has made no
Income Tax Definition and Treatment of Private and Charitable “Gifts” and a
Principled Policy Justification for the Exclusion of Gifts from Income, 78 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 441, 521 (2003) (noting that “charitable deductions are allowed
only to the extent that the donor’s wealth is reduced”).
90. The taxpayer may have additional state tax liability that is deductible.
For example, given the assumption of $40,000 of nondeductible state tax
liability, the likely state tax obligation is $50,000 given that $10,000 of SALT is
deductible, assuming that the taxpayer otherwise has sufficient additional
itemized expenses to forego the standard deduction.
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sacrifice and who in fact now profits from the transaction.
Through the charitable deduction, the taxpayer finances a
$40,000 liability by paying only $25,200. The $14,800
savings is kept by the taxpayer and deducted.
If the state tax benefit is less than a 100% credit, a
taxpayer may still be able to profit from a charitable
contribution. To take one example, assume the state
provides an 80% income tax credit for contributions to Fund
Y and again the taxpayer has a nondeductible state tax
obligation of $40,000. The taxpayer makes a $40,000
contribution to Fund Y and gets a $32,000 reduction in
state tax liability in return, thereby reducing (direct) state
income tax payments to $8,000.91 If the $40,000 is
deductible as a charitable contribution on the taxpayer’s
federal return, the taxpayer saves $14,800 in taxes. This
savings can be used to pay the remaining $8,000 of state
tax liability, with another $6,800 left over for the taxpayer
to keep. Thus, in order to fund a tax obligation of $40,000,
the taxpayer has an outlay of $48,000 ($40,000 transfer to
Fund Y and $8,000 in direct tax payments), the after-tax
cost of which is $33,200.
In this example, therefore, the $40,000 in state tax
liability can cost the taxpayer $40,000 if made directly to
the state or $33,200 if made to Fund Y. In other words,
reducing the amount of the state credit from 100% to 80%
means a lower economic benefit to the taxpayer, $6,800
instead of $14,800, but in either case, the taxpayer profits
from the transaction. This is little more than using the
charitable deduction as a tax shelter, not as a means to
promote sacrifice.
As explained in a recent paper by the Institute on
Taxation & Economic Policy some taxpayers already appear

91. The $8,000 tax payment may be deductible under SALT if the taxpayer
had not already used the $10,000 SALT deduction (and has sufficient other
itemized expenses).
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to be taking advantage of this sort of profit taking. 92 The
State of Alabama offers a 100% income tax credit for certain
contributions.93 Prior to the TCJA, the take up rate with
respect to the credit was low, suggesting that taxpayers had
little interest in making these contributions in lieu of
payments to the State’s general treasury fund (which could
be used for any purpose of the State).94 However, after the
TCJA’s SALT limitation made state tax payments more
expensive, taxpayers have an economic incentive to shift
payments from the State’s general fund to the State
sanctioned charity, and the Alabama 100% credit program
quickly reached its limit.95 The timing of the sudden
popularity of the credit program suggests taxpayers
recognized the ability to profit from the charitable
deduction.
3. Lack of supportive congressional intent
For the Treasury Department or the courts to construe
the charitable deduction to allow a deduction for state tax
benefits, and to incentivize profitable transactions in this
manner, would run counter to the purpose of the deduction
without any supportive congressional intent. In the words
of the Supreme Court in Hernandez, the courts should not
“expand the charitable contribution deduction . . . beyond
what Congress has provided;”96 an outcome the court was
“loath to effect . . . in the absence of supportive

92. CARL DAVIS, INST. ON TAX’N & ECON. POL’Y, SALT/CHARITABLE
WORKAROUND CREDITS REQUIRE A BROAD FIX, NOT A NARROW ONE: NARROW
FEDERAL ACTION WOULD BE UNFAIR, ARBITRARY, AND INEFFECTIVE 2 (2018),
https://itep.org/wp-content/uploads/charitableworkaround_0518.pdf.
93. Id. at 9–10.
94. Id. at 10–11 (noting that “It was not until the donations actually become
profitable for a larger group of taxpayers—because of the SALT cap—that the
state began easily distributing its full credit allotment.”).
95. Id.
96. Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 693 (1989).
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congressional intent.”97
In the TCJA, Congress expressly eliminated the
deductibility of state and local tax payments above
$10,000.98 At a minimum, this illustrates Congress’s intent
to deny a deduction for state tax payments. As explained in
Section II.A, a corollary of the change is to moot the full
deduction rule, which allowed a deduction for an otherwise
deductible amount. Thus, Congress changed the policy of
the SALT deduction, but left alone the general principle
that a charitable contribution reflects taxpayer sacrifice.
There is no supportive congressional intent in the TCJA to
undermine this basic principle of charitable contribution
law.99
Further, as a general matter, there is historical
precedent that Congress does not intend for tax benefits
associated with the charitable deduction to generate
taxpayer profit.100 Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1969, the
combination of a fair market value-based charitable

97. Id.
98. Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11042, 131 Stat. 2054, 2088–87 (2017) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
99. Others have argued that recharacterizing tax payments as charitable
contributions is to take a form over substance approach contrary to
congressional intent. See Faber supra note 62, at 11 (citing substance over form
as the basis for disallowing the charitable deduction); Walczak, supra note 62,
at 6 (same). Professor Amandeep Grewal provides an in depth discussion of a
substance over form approach as compared to alternatives in Ineffective SALT
Substitute, supra note 11 (recommending a substance over form approach). As a
general matter, a substance over form approach would apply only to state
credits not deductions, and does not address the broader issue of the
appropriate measurement of a contribution for federal tax purposes after the
TCJA.
100. Even if it was possible under prior law for taxpayers, especially AMT
taxpayers, to profit from the charitable deduction, it does not follow that it was
right or correct as a matter of law. By (potentially) opening the floodgates to
charitable tax shelters the TCJA has called attention to a problem that already
existed in the periphery. Further, by undermining the full deduction rule, the
TCJA gives the Treasury Department and the courts the opportunity to protect
the integrity of the charitable deduction.
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deduction for appreciated property and high marginal
ordinary income tax rates made it possible for a taxpayer to
be better off donating rather than selling property. This
result was anathema to Congress. In changing the law to
reduce the amount allowed as a deduction, the Senate
Finance Committee explained that the charitable deduction
was not:
intended to provide greater—or even nearly as great—tax benefits
in the case of gifts of property than would be realized if the
property were sold and the proceeds were retained by the
taxpayer. In cases where the tax savings is so large, it is not clear
how much charitable motivation actually remains. It appears that
the Government, in fact, is almost the sole contributor to the
charity.101

This excerpt shows that the Committee viewed the
charitable deduction as an incentive to encourage acts of
generosity. If tax benefits become too lucrative, they cloud
donative intent, and Congress concluded that there should
be no deduction even though the charity still received
valuable property.102
101. S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 80–81 (1969). For additional discussion of the
change, see Roger Colinvaux, Charitable Contributions of Property: A Broken
System Reimagined, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 263 (2013). Note that the ability of
taxpayers to deduct untaxed appreciation is also a windfall to donors, widely
viewed as a mistake the Treasury Department made in writing regulations
early in the 20th century. Id. at 268. The Treasury Department should not
make a similar mistake now.
102. S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 80–81. The legislation reduced the amount allowed
as a deduction from fair market value to the donor’s cost basis (i.e., a recovery of
the amount paid for the property). Id. One could argue that because this result
required legislation, legislation should also be required today. However, the
argument of this Article is that the basis for ignoring state tax benefits under
prior law—the full deduction rule—was the general deductibility of state and
local taxes. With the SALT limitation of the TCJA mooting the full deduction
rule, regular charitable contribution principles come into play making
additional legislation unnecessary. Of course Congress could amend the law
specifically to allow the deduction of state and local tax benefits, but Congress
has not. Furthermore, the reason legislation was required in 1969 was because
the external features of a donation of property would not take into account the
tax savings of not paying tax on capital gain. Whether the taxpayer would have
otherwise sold the property and triggered the capital gains tax is a subjective
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Thus, historically, Congress has not intended for the
charitable deduction to become a windfall for the taxpayer.
Construing the meaning of contribution to allow a
deduction for amounts not spent, absent express
congressional intent, is inconsistent with this basic goal and
would expand the deduction beyond its historic confines as
a giving incentive into a profitable tax shelter. The measure
of a contribution is a taxpayer’s sacrifice; state tax benefits
received for a charitable transfer should be taken into
account.
III. IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY CONCERNS
The implications of the implicit repeal of the full
deduction rule and measuring a contribution by the extent
of a taxpayer’s sacrifice are several. Most obvious is that
state efforts to avoid the cap on the SALT deduction by
setting up charitable funds for taxpayers to make transfers
in exchange for state tax benefits would be ineffective. More
broadly affected though, would be the deductibility of other
payments to section 501(c)(3) organizations that trigger
state tax benefits and previously have been deductible.103
There also would be administrative issues associated with
denying a charitable deduction for state tax benefits.
A. Nondeductibility of Previously Deductible Expenses
As argued in this Article, the historic approach to
defining a contribution as the measure of a taxpayer’s
sacrifice strongly suggests that no charitable deduction is
allowed for state tax benefits. This analysis applies equally
to existing state credits and deductions as to credits
designed to avoid the SALT limit. Thus, whereas before the

question and not an inherent part of the transfer.
103. The FDR Paper provides a listing of many such state programs. FDR
Paper, supra note 9, at App’x. A. See also DAVIS, supra note 92, at 11–15
(providing an overview of different state credit programs).
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TCJA, a taxpayer could deduct as charity the value of a
100% tax credit; after the TCJA no deduction for the state
tax benefit should be allowed.
Further, as explained below, although denying a
charitable deduction for amounts that previously were
deductible as charity may seem like a dramatic legal
change, doing so in fact reflects the status quo of pre-TCJA
law, in that under prior law, given the loss of a SALT
deduction, a charitable deduction for state tax benefits was
not a benefit to the taxpayer. Accordingly, to deny a
charitable deduction for state tax benefits after the TCJA is
a change more of form than substance.
To illustrate, consider again a state that offers a 100%
income tax credit for payments to a state preferred
charity.104 Before the TCJA, as a matter of federal law it
made no difference to a taxpayer whether the taxpayer
made a payment to the charity or directly to the state. A
full deduction for the payment was allowed in either case,
whether under the SALT deduction or the full deduction
rule.
For example, if a taxpayer in the 37% federal income
tax bracket made a $1,000 payment, the federal subsidy
would be $370 either as a SALT deduction or as a
charitable deduction. The charitable deduction for the value
of the state tax benefit provided no added benefit. The same
was true for less valuable state tax credits or a state
charitable deduction. The federal charitable deduction for
the value of the state tax benefit was an offset to the loss of
the SALT deduction.
After the TCJA, however, if the full deduction rule
continues to be applied, the charitable deduction would now
be a gain to the taxpayer. For instance, in the example

104. The Supreme Court discussed an Establishment Clause challenge to one
such program in Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125 (2011).
See also FDR Paper, supra note 9, at 651–52.
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above, if the taxpayer makes the $1,000 payment to the
state, the federal subsidy is zero (assuming the SALT cap is
otherwise met). If the taxpayer makes the payment to the
state preferred charity, the federal subsidy is $370, all of
which represents a profit to the taxpayer. In other words,
before the TCJA, federal tax law was neutral between the
two payments. Continued deductibility as charity of the
state tax benefits would undermine this neutrality and spur
taxpayers to make contributions to the state preferred
charity, and at a potentially high cost to the federal
treasury.
The authors of the FDR Paper cite federalism concerns
as a reason to allow continued deductibility of state tax
benefits. According to the FDR Paper, the full deduction
rule “is properly neutral” toward state initiatives. 105
However, as discussed above, this was true prior to the
TCJA, when the full deduction rule allowed a charitable
deduction in order to foster symmetry with the SALT
deduction. After the TCJA, a federally neutral approach is
to deny the charitable deduction for state tax benefits; to do
otherwise is to directly subsidize the provision of state tax
benefits, which is not neutral. In addition, states would
remain free to offer incentives that reduce the cost of the
transaction and a federal deduction would still be available
with respect to the payment unless the state fully
reimbursed the taxpayer’s cost.
In short, the critical point is that not to allow a
charitable deduction for state tax benefits after the TCJA is
in fact to remain faithful to the status quo prior to the
TCJA. The status quo was that taxpayers derived no benefit
from the charitable deduction.106 To apply the full deduction
rule after the TCJA would be to provide a new benefit, to

105. FDR Paper, supra note 9, at 654.
106. As discussed, supra notes 73 and 100, AMT taxpayers did derive a
benefit.
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define charity in a new way that does not require sacrifice,
and to allow a deduction for kept amounts.
B. Administrative Issues
Disallowing a charitable deduction for state tax benefits
will have administrative implications. A detailed discussion
of administrative issues is beyond the scope of this
Article.107 As a general matter, however, because taxpayers
would have to reduce the amount claimed as a federal
charitable deduction by the value of any state tax benefits
received, the amount of the state tax benefit for charitable
transfers would have to be determined as a routine part of
federal tax preparation.
If the state tax benefit is a credit, in general, the value
of the tax benefit is the amount paid times a set percentage.
As the FDR Paper authors detail, charitable tax credits
may have a number of complicating features, including
caps, filing status limits, varying credit percentages,
priority rules, and carryforwards.108 These features attest
to the complexity of the particular state credit at issue, but
nonetheless, the amount, even if complex to calculate, must
be determined by the taxpayer in any event and so can be
accounted for on the federal return.
If the state tax benefit takes the form of a deduction,
the value of the tax benefit depends on the state marginal

107. The authors of the FDR Paper wrote a second paper that focused on
administrative problems with limiting the full deduction rule. Caveat IRS,
supra note 46. Many of the problems they identify relate to possible changes to
the full deduction rule that are not suggested in this Article. For example, they
consider the implications of applying the full deduction rule to some charities
but not others and the potential difficulties of measuring the contribution when
both federal and state tax benefits are taken into account. Id. at 550–556.
Neither approach is suggested here, thus the authors’ concerns about
arbitrariness and circularity, which make up the bulk of the paper, are of less
relevance. The FDR Paper also argues that eliminating the full deduction rule
would present “administrative difficulties.” FDR Paper, supra note 9, at 654.
108. Caveat IRS, supra note 46, at 552.
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rate of the taxpayer. In states with one income tax rate, the
value of the benefit is straightforward (the amount paid
times the rate). In states where the value of the benefit
depends upon knowing the marginal rate of the taxpayer,
the calculation is more complex, yet still is a calculation
already required for purposes of the state return. The
challenge, as with a credit, is accounting for the value of the
state tax benefit on the federal return.
The principal administrative challenges thus likely
relate to timing issues. These would arise if the taxpayer
files the federal return before the state return. In such
cases, the taxpayer would have to determine for the federal
return the value of state tax benefits prior to filing the state
return. This is made more complex for states that base
state taxable income on federal taxable income, which as
the FDR Paper authors point out, “depends on the amount
of the federal deduction allowed.”109 In addition, if a state
denies the claimed benefit, or the taxpayer subsequently
does not claim the state tax benefit, the taxpayer in theory
should be allowed to increase the claimed amount of the
federal charitable deduction through an amended return.
One possible solution to these concerns, proffered by the
FDR Paper authors, would be to delay the accounting for
state tax benefits to the year following the contribution
year.110 In the year of contribution, the taxpayer would take
a federal charitable deduction that included the value of the
state tax benefit. The following year, the taxpayer would
include as income the value of the state tax benefit. This is
a similar approach to accounting for state tax refunds (and

109. Id. at 551. Professor Grewal notes that “only 6 states use federal taxable
income as the starting point to compute state taxable income;” Most states use
adjusted gross income. Grewal, Ineffective SALT Substitute, supra note 11, at
25, n.124. Further, as Grewal suggests, to the extent circularity problems arise,
“that would reflect a problem appropriately addressed by changing the state tax
system, not by twisting Section 170.” Id., n.123.
110. Caveat IRS, supra note 46, at 553.
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other state payments) on federal returns.111 This is not to
suggest that such an approach is necessarily the best or
would address all issues, but rather to note that
administrative solutions could and would be developed. 112
In short, although denying a federal charitable
deduction for the value of state tax benefits would introduce
additional complexity to tax administration, complexity is a
mainstay of the federal tax system and often necessary as a
matter of law and to implement sound policy. The policy
here is to maintain the charitable deduction as an incentive
to give not to profit. To subsidize amounts not spent is not
the purpose of the charitable deduction, nor is such an
expansion of the charitable deduction legally required by
the TCJA. Potential administrative concerns should not be
decisive in construing the meaning of a contribution for
federal tax purposes.
IV. CONCLUSION
Before the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, state tax benefits
could be deducted as charitable contributions pursuant to a
full deduction rule. The IRS conceived the full deduction
rule against a legal baseline of deductible state tax
payments. The essence of the rule was to allow as a
charitable contribution the deduction of an otherwise
deductible expense. As such, the full deduction rule was an
instrument of the SALT deduction not the charitable
deduction and did not make taxpayers better off.
The TCJA fundamentally changed the law by
substantially limiting the deductibility of state and local tax
payments. One corollary of the change is to undermine the

111. See IRS Form 1099-G: Certain Government Payments.
112. As a general matter, as Professor Grewal argues, “[i]ntertwined tax
systems no doubt present compliance questions, but we now have years of
principles and practices to help answer them.” Grewal, Ineffective SALT
Substitute, supra note 11, at 26.
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full deduction rule, leaving open the question of how to
account for state tax benefits for purposes of the charitable
deduction.
Under established principles, a charitable contribution
is measured by the taxpayer’s sacrifice. If the cost of a
taxpayer’s payment to charity is reduced by state tax
benefits, the taxpayer’s sacrifice is reduced. Accordingly, a
contribution for federal tax purposes should take into
account the value of state tax benefits received.
Continued application of the full deduction rule is not
warranted and would convert the charitable deduction from
an incentive to give into an incentive to profit. Allowing a
deduction for state tax benefits would be to allow taxpayers
to deduct amounts not spent and that are available for the
taxpayer’s use. This result is anathema to the fundamental
idea of an incentive for giving and for selfless behavior. The
result applies equally to credits devised as workarounds to
the SALT deduction as to other state credits and
deductions. States remain free to provide tax benefits for
transfers to charity, but the value of the tax benefits
received should not be considered part of the contribution
for federal tax purposes.
The issue going forward for the Treasury Department
and the courts is stark: to allow the charitable deduction to
become a tax shelter, or to preserve the historic nature of
the deduction as an incentive for selfless behavior.

